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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LILLIAK FOX,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 9122

ROSS N. TAYLOR,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff's staten1ent of the facts fails to give the
cmnplete picture. Therefore, we make our own statement.
The accident occurred on September 30, 1958, at
about 7 :-1-3 A.~L at approximately 1028 East 5th South
in Salt Lake City, "L-:-tah, (R. 21-22, 28). It was undisputed
that extending along 5th South Street from 11th East all
the way down to lOth East there was a solid island in the
center of the street separating eastbound traffic frmu
westbound traffic, (R. 30, 51, 64-65; also diagram, Exhibit
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P-4 and photos, D-5, D-6, D-7 and D-8). By reference to
the diagrmn, Exhibit P-4, the curbs on either side of thP
island were 5 inches high and the width of the island
at the approxin1ate point of the accident was 5 or 6 feet.
[t was further undisputed that at the· place where the
plaintiff was crossing the street there was no marked
pedestrian lane, ( R. 29, 51, 65). In his brief counsel refers to two points shown on the diagrmn, Exhibit P-4,
~aid points being 1narked as C-1 and C-2. In describing
the course of the defendant's vehicle, counsel states that
the defendant continued to point C-1 and then on to C-~.
In the course of his argun1ent counsel implies that the
defendant changed lanes from the point C-1 to the point
C-2. This is not true. Nowhere in the defendant's testiuwny did he testify as to point C-1 or C-2, and nowhere
in his testiinony did he indicate that he had proceeded for
any distance in the outside lane. His testi1nony was clear
that when he Inade his turn, he proceeded directly into
the inside lane for eastbound traffic (R. 111). Points
C-1 and C-2 were placed upon the diagrmn by the defendant's witness, l\I yer, in connection with his cross-examination. 1\fyer was asked whether there were any other eastbound aut01nobiles in the vicinity, and referred to an
eastbound vehicle sorne distance behind the defendant's
B-,ord car. The point C-1 was to indicate where this unidentified eastbound car was on the road at the time that
the defendant's car was at the point indicated on the diagram by G-2, (R. 83-84).
Koneta Court is a small eourt that intersects 5th
South Street from the south only. At the point where it
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enters 5th Houth Street it is no wider than a driveway
or approxilnately 12 feet in width, (R. 65-66, diagram~
Exhibit P-4, photos, Exhibit D-5, D-6, D-7, D-8). There
was a marked crosswalk across 5th South up at the intersection of 11th East, ( R. 29). There were no sidewalks
extending out to the south curb line frmn either side of
Koneta Court. By reference to the diagram and the
photographs aforernentioned, it will be observed that
Barbara Place intersects 5th South Street frmn the north
only. By using the scale on the diagram, Barbara PlacP
would be located approxin1ately 15 feet east of Koneta
Court. Also, by reference to the diagrarn and photographs aforernentioned it will be observed that Isabella
Court intersected 5th South fron1 the south only, and
again by reference to the scale on the diagran1, this court
v\·ould be located approximately 80 feet east of Koneta
Court and approxirnately 10 feet east of Barbara Place.
As indicated b~.· the photographs and the diagrarn, it likewise is no wider than a private driveway, (Exhibits P -4~
D-5, D-6, D-7, D-8).
The plaintiff was ernployed as a clairns secretary for
the American Surety Cmnpany, (R. 20). She resided on
the south side of 5th South Street just west of Koneta
Court, (R. 21). Jacobs, another employee of the Ameriran Surety Cornpany, with whom the plaintiff was ac<luainted, had been picking up plaintiff and taking her to
"·ork 5 days a week for severalrnonths before the accident. He always called for her about 7 :45 A.~f. Another
employee, ~I ildred Peters, was in the car with hin1 on
these occasions. He always stopped in Barbara Place
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headed west, pulling completely off the traveled portion
of 5th South Street, (R. 30, 31, 50, 63).
The plaintiff had lived on that street for approxilnately 9 years and was very familiar with the traffic
particularly at 7:45 A.M., (R. 28). As a n1atter of fact,
she testified that she always had to take precautions because it was a busy street, (R. 23). She also testified
that it was very heavily traveled at that ti1ne of the
morning, (R. 28).
Miss Peters testified that she custmnarily found at
that time of the day there was a lot of traffic going both
east and west along 5th South Street, (R. 51, 52).
Jacobs testified that there was heavy traffic proceeding both east and west at that time of the Inorning, eastbound traffic going to the University, and westbound
traffic coming into town, (R. 64). Both Peters and
Jacobs testified that because of the heavy traffic, they
always moved off 5th South Street and parked in the
driveway at Barbara Place, (R. 50, 64). Both Peters
and Jacobs further testified that on one or two occasion~
prior to the automobile accident they had discussed the
hazard of crossing the street with the plaintiff, and that
Jacobs had offered to drive around the block and come
back headed east on 5th South Street so as to pick her up
on the south side of the street in front of her home and
thereby make it unnecessary for her to cross the street
in heavy traffic. However, the plaintiff had said that
this was not necessary, (R. 52, 53, 54, 66, 67). The plaintiff was, of course, fully aware o£ the heavy traffic by
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reason of having crossed the street for several 1nonths
before at that time of the day and having lived on the
street for nine years. However, in addition she testified
that 5th South Street was "a very heavily traveled
street," (R. 28).
The plaintiff testified that she had always crossed
the street at this particular tin1e and place. On the Inorning of the accident she left the front door of her house,
walked down the driveway of l(oneta Court to the ditch
on the south side of the street, and then looked to the
·west for approaching eastbound traffic, (R. 31, 32). Shr
said that the boulevard was clear except for one car which
was down by the Custmn Furniture, or about threequarters of a block away. At that time the car had not
reached the curve, and she was not sure whether it would
make the curve or go south on lOth East, (R. 32-33).
She had no idea as to the make of the car or how fast it
was traveling, (R. 33). From the time she made thi.s
observation when standing in the ditch on Koneta Court
on the south side of the street she then "walked rapidly
across the street." She did not see the automobile again
and was not conscious of its approach until the moment
of the impact. As a 1natter of fact, she admitted that
after making her observation 'vhile at the south curb or
ditch line of 5th South Street, she did not look again for
eastbound cars as she crossed the street, ( R. 34-35).
There was considerable dispute in the evidence as to
just where the plaintiff was in the street when she was
struck by the car. According to her testimony, she was
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just stepping onto the island when the accident occurred,
(R. 22) ; yet, she admitted that the car did not go onto
the island to strike her, (R. 36). ~\fter the accident, she
admitted that she \vas lying with her feet just onto the
island and the rest of her body just south of the island,
(R. 36).
Miss Peters testified that she ~aw Fox come out the
front door and start down the front steps of her horne,
then she turned away to open the right front door, (R.
4:2), and did not thereafter see the plaintiff until just a
split second before the accident occurred, (R. 54). At
this ti1ne the car was very close to her, and she saw one
leg extending out, but wouldn't want to say whether 1t
was on the island or not. She had no opinion as to how
far the left side of the car was at the time she observed it
frmn the south edge of the island and had no idea at all
as to its speed. She did observe, however, that the plaintiff rolled off the left side of the fender over toward the
left of the car, (R. 55, 56). The car itself did not go up
onto the island. The plaintiff when she cmne to rest was
about 6 feet frmn the point of i1npact. She observed one
of the plaintiff's shoes on the line dividing the two lanes
for eastbound traffic and also observed the plaintiff's
purse about 6 feet southeast of the island, (R. 56, 57, 58).
J.acobs testified that while he was stopped in Barbara Place on the 1norning of the accident he sa}V the
plaintiff leave her front door, come down to Koneta
Court at the south side of 5th South, where she waited
1nomentarily and looked westward down the street, and
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then "began to hurry across the street," and ·was ahnost
to the center island when struck by the autornobile, (R.
61). When he first observed the car, it was about 20 feet
away frmn the plaintiff, (R. 62), and its left wheels were
approximately one and one-half to two feet south of the
island, (R. 63). He said that when she started to eros~
the street she proceeded in a general northeasterly direction toward his parked car, (H. 68-70). He estirnated
the speed of the car in the "neighborhood of approximately 30 utiles an hour," (R. 70-71), and said that lw
had observed frmn previous occasions that that was the
speed at whieh cars at that tirne of the rnorning going
east on 5th South generally traveled, (R. 74). He further
testified that front the tirne the plaintiff started across
the street until the n1ornent of the accident she was hurrying and was still moving at the time of the aecident. He
said that when she carne in contact with the car, she went
over the left front fender and off to the left side of the
car, and after the accident was lying not rnore than 8 or
10 feet from the point of irnpact, (R. 71).
Clifford 1Iyer, an employee of the Utah State Road
Commission, was with a survey crew that was working
in the area at the time of the aceident. He was do·wn by
the retaining wall at lOth East and 5th South approximately on the center line of 5th South Street looking east
along said 5th South Street. He had been making sonte
shots with another state employee who was in the center
of 5th South Street, but up at the 11th East intersection,
(R. 76-77). He indicated his position by a little "m" on
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the diagram, Exhibit P--1-. He testified that between the
hours of 7 :00 A.M. and 8 :00 A.:.M. 5th South Street was
heavily traveled.
vVhile looking east along the center of 5th South
Street he heard a screeching sound and then observed
the defendant's car and a black object as it rolled off the
side of the left front fender. From where he was sighting
he testified that the left wheels of the defendant's car
were 4-6 feet south of the center island, (R. 77-78). The
car was swerving to the right and carne to a stop very
quickly. It stopped within half the distance of the car,
(R. 79). He had casually observed the car before and said
it was not going nearly as fast as the traffic cmning
down the street, (R. 79). Following the accident the
plaintiff was lying a foot and a half south of the island,
(R. 79).
\V esley C. Larson also testified on behalf of the defendant. He was the men1ber of the survey crew that was
in the center of 5th South Street but up at 11th East
Street and looking down west toward iliyer, (R. 86-87).
He heard the brakes and then observed that the plaintiff
was between the ornmnent in the center of the car and the
left front fender. The left side of the car at this time
was 4 feet south of the center island. The car stopped
very fast and did not travel over a car length, (R. 88).
Following the accident, the plaintiff was lying about 3
feet south of the island. He went down to the scene and
observed the brake marks fr01n the defendant's car which
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

he estimated to be about 12 feet long from the rear of the
car, (R. 89-90).
Sidney LeSieur was another 1nember of the survey
crew who testified on behalf of the defendant. He was
standing right next to Myer on the line with the center
of 5th South Street but down at lOth East, (R. 91-92).
He heard the screech of brakes. The only thing that he
observed was the position of the plaintiff after the accjdent and the location of one of her shoes. She was lying
approximately 3 feet south of the island with no part
of her body on the island. He observed a shoe about 5 or
G feet southeasterly of the plaintiff, and 11 feet south
of the island, or about on the line dividing the two lane~
for eastbound traffic. He did observe so1ne skid marks
caused by the defendant's car and estimated that they
were only 10-12 feet long up to the point where the rear
end of the car 'vas after the accident, (R. 92-93). He also
said that the particular area where the accident occurred
was awfully bad for traffic, and that the me1nbers of
the survey crew wouldn't dare go out onto the street
without a red vest on, (R. 95). He said the only warning
signs to indicate any survey crewmen were in the area
would be further south on lOth East Street from the
point where the defendant had entered lOth East Street.
~one of the crewmen were in the street in the vicinity
where the accident occurred, (R. 94).
Proctor Lescoe, the investigating officer, was also
called as a witness for the defense. He arrived on the
scene at 7:51 A.l\1., (R. 97). According to his measureSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1nents, the plaintiff's feet were 6 inches frmn the south
edge of the island, and her head :2 feet frmn the south
edge of the island. No part of her body was on the island,
(R. 98-99). She was lying approximately 19 feet east of
the east edge of Koneta Court. l-Ie observed brake marks
eaused from all four wheels of the defendant's car and
measured thmn to be 17 feet long. The car itself had been
moved from the point where it had cmne to rest and was
facing in a northeasterly direction, (R. 99-100). There
was no broken glass on the car and no visible damage to
it, (R.lOl).
Ross Taylor, the defendant, testified that he was
attending the lTniversity at the time and was on his ·way
to a class which started at the University at 8:00 A.:JL,
(R. 109-110). At the ti1ne of the accident he ·was residing
at 851 East 5th South, (R. 109). He had left his home
and driven east on 5th South to lOth East where he
1nade a left turn and went north on lOth East to the point
where there is an entrance to the 5th South curve. At this
point he came to a full stop at the stop sign and waited
for several eastbound cars to pass. He then 1nade a
turn from his stopped position to go east on 5th South,
and in doing so, turned into the inside lane on 5th South,
(R. 111). At that time the sun had a tendency to throw
a glare on the far right side of his windshield. It did not
block his view ahead and he could see clearly in his lane
of traffic, (R. 111-112). He was looking straight ahead,
(R. llG). He was traveling at a speed of about 25 miles
per hour, (R. 112) with the left side of his car possibly
3-4 feet south of the island, (R. 117), when he observed
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the plaintiff about 10 feet ahead of the right front fender
of his car, (R. 112-113). He immediately applied the
brakes and swerved to the right and thought his vehicle
may have n1oved a foot or two to the right before the
impact. From the time he first observed the woman until
the time of the accident she was running to the north, and
at the time of the impact she was possibly 5 or 6 feet
south of the island, (R. 112-113). She rolled over the top
of the left front fender and over to the left side of the car,
but never came back as far as the windshield. He stopped
his car within a distance of possibly two car lengths, not
more, (R. 113). Either an ann or a leg of the plaintiff
was on the island, and the rmnainder of the body wa~
south of the island, (R. 114). He did not tell the plaintiff
that he had not seen her because the sun was in his eyes,
(R. 114-115). He thought it was the glare of the sun
on the right side of his windshield that prevented hint
from seeing the plaintiff until she entered the path of
his car, (R. 118). lie further testified that prior to the
time that the accident had occurred he had never known
and was not aware of the fact that Koneta Court was
even on that street, (R. 121-122). With further reference
to the glare of the sun, he stated that as soon as he turned
onto 5th South and his car was headed in a southeasterly
direction, the sun was off to the southeast and he could
see the glare. The glare became more as he made his turn
going east but moved to the right of the vehicle, (R. 122),
but at no time interfered with his vision directly ahead
in the lane of traffic in which he was proceeding, (R. 123).
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STATE:JIENT OF

POI~TS

POINT I.
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LAST
CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE WAS PROPERLY REFUSED.
POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON
THE PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT BY IMPLICATION OR OTHERWISE ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCT THE JURY TO THE
PLAINTIFF'S PREJUDICE THAT ALL PLAINTIFF DID
WAS TO MERELY GLANCE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE
APPROACHING VEHICLE.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
ARGU~fENT

POINT I.
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LAST
CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE WAS PROPERLY REFUSED.

The plaintiff's requested instruction No. 6 was an
attempt to have the court apply the last clear chance
doctrine to the case. The theory was that the plaintiff
was in a position of danger fr01n which she was unable
to free herself, that the defendant either discovered or
by exercise of due care should have discovered her peril,
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and at that tiu1e had n clear opportunity to avoid the
accident but failed to avail himself of such opportunity.
rnder the facts as presented in this case the court properly refused this requested instruction.
The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff stopped
at the ditch on the south side of the street, looked to
the northwest for approaching eastbound traffic, and
then without 1naking any further observations whatsoever, rapidly ·walked or ran in a diagonal northeasterly
direction across the street. She did not see the car and
\vas not conscious of its presence or approach until the
mornent of the i1npact. Because of the center island proceeding all the way down the street, the only source frmn
which the plaintiff could anticipate any trouble until she
reached the center island was from vehicles proceeding
in an easterly dii·ection along 5th South Street. None
theless, she wholly failed to make any observations for
such vehicles after leaving the ditch on the south side of
5th South Street. It is undisputed that at the time of the
accident the defendant's vehicle was in the inside lane
for eastbound traffic, which would mean that the plaintiff
rapidly walked or ran approximately 20 feet before she
would enter the lane in which the defendant's vehicle
was traveling. There is no testimony by any witnesses
that the defendant vvas traveling at any excessive rate of
speed. His own testi1nony was approximately 25 miles
per hour. The plaintiff's witness, Jacobs, said that the
vehicle was traveling approximately 30 miles an hour,
but this was what all vehicles traveled from his observations in going east up the highway. The brake marks
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and the stopping distance would certainly indicate no
speed beyond 25 miles per hour. The defendant testified
that although he had clear vision in his own lane of traffic, his view to the right was obscured by the rays of the
sun which at that time of the morning would be south and
east of his course of travel and shining toward the right
side of his car. It is undisputed that the plaintiff was not
crossing the street in any n1arked crosswalk, and the
court ruled that she was not crossing the street at an unInarked crosswalk at an intersection. The plaintiff's
counsel is evidently satisfied with this ruling of the lower
court as no issue is made thereon in connection with his
brief on appeal. The defendant, notwithstanding the
glare of the sun to the right of his car, observed the plaintiff as soon as she cmne into the path of his vehicle opposite the right front fender, at which time she was running
and his vehicle was only about 10 feet away. He linmediately applied his brakes and t;werved to the right
and thought he

Ina~·

have turned his vehicle 2 feet to the

right before the actual iuqmct occurred. The plaintiff
eontinued rapidly walking or running during all of this
ti1ne.
This court in the case of Graham v. Johnson, 109
Utah 346, 166 Pac. (2d) 230, 109 Utah 365, 172 Pac. (2d)
665, in comn1enting upon the application of the last clear
chance doctrine, cites with approval from Chapter 17,
Sections -!79 and 480 of Volume 2 of Restatement of the
Law or Torts, and in the course of its opinion said:
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"In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's
neligence has become in a sense fixed and realizable and on to this state of things defendant approaches on to the negligent plaintiff with and
in control of the danger.

* * * *
"One should not be held liable for failing t n
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a
situation where it is speculative as to whether h('
was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In
a. situation where both parties are on the m01:e the
s~gnificance of the word 'clear' is most important.
Otherwise we may put the onus of avoiding the
effect of one's negligence on a party not negligent.
That party's negligence only arises when it is
definitely established that there was ample tin1P
and opportunity to avoid the accident which wa~
not taken advantage of." (Emphasis added.)

The facts in the Graham case were somewhat in dispute, but it was clear that the defendant in that case knew
of the presence of the minor on the street as she ap·
proached and also knew that the minor was unaware of
her approach. Each of these items are wholly lacking in
the present case.
We quote from page 358, Chapter 17, Section 480 of
the Restatmnent of the Law of Torts as follows:
"It is not enough that the defendant should
see the plaintiff in a position which would be
dangerous were the plaintiff not aware of what is
going on. The defendant must also realize or
have reason to realize that the plaintiff is inattentive and, therefore, is in peril. The defendant
is
entitled to assume tlzat the plaintiff is payin!l
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or wiJll pay reasonable attention to his surra u ndings; until he has reason to suspect the contrar)·,
he has no reason to believe that the plaintiff is in
any danger. ***" (Emphasis added.)

ln this case even had the defendant seen the plaintiff when she started to cross the street, he would have
had the right to assume that she "\vould keep a lookout
and would yield the right of way to his vehicle.
In Beckstrom 'L'. Williams, 3 Utah (2d) :210, :2S:2 Par.
( 2d) 309, a two and one-half ton tractor was pulling onto
the side of the road from a private drive~way. The defendant was proceeding south. The plaintiff stopped the
heavy tractor before entering the highway to see if it was
clear. At this time the defendant's vehicle was approximately 325 feet away. The plaintiff then proceeded ~with
the tractor 5 feet out onto the hard surfaced portion of
the road and came to a stop, at which time according to
the evidence the defendant's vehicle was still 125 feet
away. The defendant had 16 feet of highway to the east
of the tractor to avoid the accident. In applying the
last clear chance doctrine, the court in that case said
that three conditions must exist:
"(A) that plaintiff was in a danger from
which he could no longer extricate himself, (B)
that defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known. that plaintiff was so
endangered, and (C) that defendant thereafter,
by exercise of reasonable care, could have avoided
injuring the plaintiff."
In discussing the application of the first point, (A), the
Supreme Court stated that when the heavy tractor startSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
ed out onto the highway into the lane of traffic in which
the defendant was proceeding, or at least by the tin1e it
stopped in that lane, that the plaintiff then was in a position of peril, and that the defendant's truck was then 125
feet away.
In our own case in considering point (A), the plaintiff ·was in no position of peril from which she was unable
to extricate herself until she started to cross the patl1
of the autmnobile. Prior thereto she could have stopped,
yielded the right of way to the vehicle and entirely avoided the accident. vVhen she entered the path of the car,
at n1ost not more than one second would have elapsed
until the tirne of the irnpact, during '''hich time and at
the speed at which the defendant was traveling he wa~
then too close to avoid the accident.
In speaking of the application of point (B) to the
facts in the Beckstrom case, the court said that when the
defendant was at least 250 feet away, the plaintiff'~
tractor was onto the hard surface and moving forward
across the highway in full view of the defendant. However, it added this important factor:
"Concededly until the tractor was actually
in the lane of traffic, defendant cmtld reasonably
expect that it would stop. But when the tractor
continued forward, defendant was bound to know
that the driver of such a cumbersome machine
could not, in the few seconds required for defendant's truck to reach the spot, get out of the way
and avoid an accident." (Emphasis added.)

In this case when the plaintiff entered the lane in
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which the defendant's car was traveling, it was then too
late for the defendant to avoid the accident. The defendant's vehicle 1nust then have heen within approxi1nately
10-25 feet at 1nost of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff could
not stop her forward course, it would be wholly unreasonable to anticipate or expect that the driver of a motor
\Tehicle in that short ti1ne and distance could have avoided
eolliding with the plaintiff...AJl he could possibly do was
to atternpt to apply the brake and turn to the right. This
he did.
In considering the application of point (C), or the
question whether the defendant had a clear chance to
avoid the collision, the court in the Beckstron1 case said:
"There can be no doubt that it 1nust be a fair
and clear opportunity, and not just a bare possibility. The defendant cannot be pllt into the position of having to make precise calculation and
1'nanipulation to a1:oid the accident, nor mu-st it require exceptional agility or skill. The chance must
be such that an average individual using ordinary
care \vould have a real opportunity to perceive
the danger to plaintiff, to realize his inability to
escape and thereafter to avoid the hann." (Emphasis added)
The court also cited with approval frmn Morby v.
Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 Pac. (2d) 231, as follows:
"There is no doubt but that in order for the
question to be properly subinitted to a jury, the
evidence must be such as \vould reasonably support a finding that there was a fair and clear opportunity, in the exercise of reasonable care, to
avoid the injury. It would no-t be sufficient
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that it appear frorn h~n.dsight that by some possible safety measure, or even by reasonable care,
the defendant by 'the skin of his teeth' could hrrue
avoided the collision." (Emphasis added.)

In considering the application of point (C) to the
facts in the Beckstrom case, the court stated that by the
defendant's own testimony his speed was 40 miles per
hour; that at such speed his car could have been brought
to a stop, including nonnal reaction time within 126 feet,
and that when the plaintiff's tractor first entered the
road, the car \vas then 325 feet away and could thereforP
have been stopped 200 feet short of the point of impact. It
then went on to say that the defendant was not obliged
to realize the plaintiff was in inextricable peril at thi~
point, but only after the vehicle had got onto the highway.
but then said at that point the defendant's vehicle was 125
feet away and could have stopped including reaction tiine
within 126 feet or could have turned out onto the 16 feet
of unobstructed road.
No such facts are present in the instant case. Frorn
the time that the plaintiff, while either rapidly walking
or running, entered the path of the defendant's vehicle,
the defendant's vehicle at most would have been only 1025 feet away fr01n plaintiff. Traveling at a speed of 25
miles per hour, the defendant would barely have time to
react to the situation before the impact occurred. His own
testimony is that he did apply the brakes and swerve to
the right and that he probably turned 2 feet before the
actual ilnpact occurred. Certainly, under these facts it
would be wholly irnpossible to say that the defendant
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had a clear opportunity to avoid the accident after the
plaintiff rapidly walked or ran into the path of his car.
Counsel has indicated that there was nothing in the lane
to the right. Therefore, there ·was nothing to have prevented the plaintiff frmn stopping prior to the ti1ne that
8he ran into the path of the vehicle. IIad she done so,
the accident would not have occurred. After she ran into
the path of the vehicle, the defendant had no clear opportunity to avoid the accident, and the last clear chance
doctrine does not apply.
Counsel in his brief argues that the plaintiff was in
peril frmn the ti1ne that she started to cross the street
because she was unaware. This is not true, and, as indicated in the Beckstrmn case, her peril only com1nenced
when she entered the path or lane in ·which the defendant's autmnobile was traveling. At any tin1e prior thereto she could have avoided the accident cmnpletely had she
been exercising any care whatsoever.
In llforby v. Rogers, supra, the facts were entirely
different to those in the present case. The defendant had
first observed the boy on a bicycle traveling in the same
direction as the car when the defendant was 300 feet
away. At a distance of 200 feet the defendant sounded
his horn. The boy on the bicycle at no tune gave any
indication that he heard the horn. The defendant continued on until within 78 feet of the boy, but actually took no
safety measures until within 20 feet of the boy, notwithstanding the fact that at the speed at which he was traveling he could have stopped within 43 feet, or 35 feet short
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of striking the boy. The boy in that case for a distance of
300 feet was entirely in the lane of travel in which the
automobile was proceeding. The plaintiff in our case
was not in the lane of travel of the automobile until just
an instant before the impact occurred. Using the stopping distance referred to in the ~iorby case, traveling at
a speed of 25 miles per hour, the defendant, assuming
a normal reaction tiine, would travel 27¥2 feet, and it
\ronld take an additional 35 feet, or a total stopping di"tance of 62¥2 feet. By no stretch of the iinagination can
it be argued that the defendant in the instant case had
any such distance within ·which to react after the plaintiff
ran into the path of his car.
Counsel for the plaintiff also refers to the case of
Trinn 'L'. Read, 8 Utah 2d 394, 335 Pac. (2d) 627. The
facts in that case are wholly dissimilar fron1 those in this
case. In that case there was evidence that the plaintiff
had driven his horse onto the highway in front of the
defendant in the smne lane of travel in which the defendant was proceeding for a distance of 30 rods or approximately 495 feet. During all of this time the horse would
have been in view of the defendant as it was in his lane
of travel. As we have heretofore indicated, the plaintiff
in this case was never in the lane of travel of the defendant's vehicle until she suddenly rapidly walked or ran in
front of the car, at which time the defendant's car was too
close to either stop or otherwise act to avoid the accident.
See Cumpton L Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., 120 Utah
4G3, 235 Pac. (2d) 515. In that case _the plaintiff wa~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

walking along the side of a railroad track as a train approached. The court in that case in speaking of the last
clear chance doctrine, stated that it only applied:

"* * * only if the plaintiff's negligence
has come to rest and plaintiff is thereafter unable
by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care
to avoid the injury herself. The deceased in this
case was not under those circumstances of inextricable peril. The fact is that at any instant
np to the time she was actually struck, she could
by the exercise of ordinary reasonable care, have
apprehended the presence of the train, and by taking one step to the side, have avoided her tnjury."
(Emphasis added.)
Exactly the same situation is presented in the instant
case. Until the time that the plaintiff crossed in front
of the path of the defendant's vehicle, she could, by the
exercise of ordinary care, have observed the presence
of the automobile and yielded the right of way to it and
thereby completely avoided the accident. The court in the
Compton case made this further significant statement:
.. We have never held that a mere continuance
of the same inattentive negligence created a situ.ation of inextricable peril. When the injured person's negligence has not cmne to rest, as it had in
the above cases, so that by the exercise of reasonable care she would have been able to avoid the
peril at any time up to the Inoment of injury, the
injury is then the result of the concurring negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. The one
was just as much the poximate cause as the other.
Ryan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P.
71. Harper on Torts, Sec. 139, page 306, considers
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the situation of the negligent defendant and the
negligent plaintiff where the defendant is unaware
of plaintiff's peril and states: '***It follows, thus,
that the doctrine of last clear chance does not i11r
elude cases in which a plaintiff has the physical
and mental ability to avoid the risk up to the
moment of the harm. His 'continuing' negligence,
as it is sometimes called, continues to insulate the
defendant's negligence, and the ordinary rule of
contributory negligence governs the case.' " (Emphasis added.)
rrhe plaintiff's negligence in this case continued right
up to the point until she rapidly walked or ran into the
path of the car, and at this time the defendant had no
clear opportunity to avoid any accident.
In the case of Marcellin v. Osguthorpe, 9 Utah 2d 1,
336 Pac. (2d) 779, the lJtah Supreme Court again had
the opportunity to consider the last clear chance doctrine.
In that case the court said :
"There is no certainty that he ever actually
got into a situation of inextricable peril. Less so
is there any certainty that defendant either did,
or would be obliged to, so realize in time to save
him from injury. There is no reason to assume
that the defendant had to apprehend that the
plaintiff would not see the Cadillac which was in
plain sight on the highway in front of him with
the tail lights on; nor that he would continue at a
negligent rate of speed; nor that he would fail to
guide his car safely between the other two. There
actually was room to clear by several feet on either
side. On the contrary, defendant could reasonably
expect (and undoubtedly hoped) that as plaintiff
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ation ahead and moderate his speed. He could
reasonably continue to so expect as long as there
remained opportunity to do so. Plaintiff's argument that defendant should have observed from
plaintiff's speeding approach that he was in inextricable peril, and should have dimmed his lights
so plaintiff could see the Cadillac and arrest hiB
own negligence to avoid the danger, must presuppose that at any such instant he could haY<·
avoided the collision by arresting his own negligence. If plaintiff could do nothing to avert the
collision, a fortiori, defendant could do nothing
because his action by dimming his lights could
only· react through the plaintiff. It follows that
plaintiff's own negligence was a concurring proximate cause."
In the present case there is no certainty that tlw
plaintiff ever actually got into a situation of inextricablE>
peril. Certainly, it cannot be said that the defendant wa~
obliged to realize that she did in time to save her from
injury. He had the right to assume that she would be
keeping a proper lookout, even had he seen her, and that
she would exercise proper precautions for her own safety,
particularly since she ,,·as crossing where there \Yas
no marked crossvvalk and not at an unn1arked crosswalk
at an intersection. As indicated in the n[arcellin case.
the extension of the application of the doctrine would
1~equire defendant "to assun1e that plaintiff would continue to be negligent, and based thereon to realize the
approaching danger in tilne to avoid the sa1ne." The
Utah Supre1ne Court in the l\[arcellin case further stated
that the last clear chance doctrine "should not be extended beyond such cireumstances to obliterate the d~Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fen8e of contributory negligence." Under the facts in this
<·ase, to apply the last clear chance doctrine would completely obliterate the defense of contributory negligence.
It "·ould pennit a plaintiff to negligently cross a street
where there was no nmrked crosswalk, to fail to keep a
proper lookout, to run in front of a car, and then charge
the driver with anticipating that she would do all of these
things, ·with anticipating that she would fail to exercise
any precaution, and with anticipating that she would
run directly in front of his car.

\r e

think the facts in this case are closely akin to
those in the case of Cox v. Th01npson, 123 "Gtah 81, 25±
Pac. (2d) 1047, wherein a pedestrian who was walking
east across a poorly lighted highway turned and walked
directly into the path of the defendant's automobile. He
was crossing where there was no marked crosswalk and
was under the duty to yield the right of way to a vehicle
upon the road. As indicated by the court in that case,
if the decedent had yielded the right of way, or if he
had looked up the road and seen the danger, the accident
would not have occurred. The court in that case held that
the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply. The defendant first observed the decedent when he walked into
the cone of light projecting from the automobile and then
had no clear opportunity to avoid the accident. In the
present case the defendant observed the plaintiff when
she first started to cross the path of his vehicle, but then
had no clear opportunity to avoid the accident.
It is apparent from a review of the foregoing Utah
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cases that the doctrine of last clear chance is never applicable until a plaintiff arrives at a point as to be in peril. In
this case the point was reached when the plaintiff started
to cross in front of the defendant's vehicle. It is also
clear that the doctrine of last clear chance should never be
applied to the ordinary case in which the act creating tlw
peril occurs practically simultaneously with the happening of the accident, and in which neither party can be said
to have had a last clear chance thereafter to avoid the
consequence. If the defendant, with a vehicle traveling
25 miles per hour had a last clear chance to avoid the
accident, then certainly it could be said with more force
and effect that the plaintiff had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident because all she needed to do was make
a further observation to know that she had incorrectly
appraised the situation, and she could easily have stopped, whereas, it takes some distance within which to stop
a moving vehicle. The plaintiff knew that the street was
heavily traveled. She knew the danger frmn previous
experience. The sun was not in her eyes. She was not
concerned with traffic coming from any direction except
that of the defendant's vehicle until she reached the
center island. Her negligence under such circu1nstances
in failing to 1nake any further look after leaving the ditch
on the south side of the street was not only negligent, but
entirely foolhardy.
The case of Covington t·. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378.
29± Pac. (~d) 788, is in point. In that case a nwtorcyclist
was held guilty of contributory negligence as a 1natter
of law in failing to keep a proper lookout. There. as in
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the present case, the plaintiff was not faced with the duty
of lnultiple appraiselnent as he was proceeding down
the street nor with any road hazard of any kind, yet he
wholly failed to see the defendant's vehicle as it was backing away frorn the curb. The court in that case held that
the plaintiff's action in failing to watch the o:aly potential
hazard upon the road constituted contributory negligence
as a n1atter of law. We feel that in this case the plaintiff's conduct in failing to watch the only potential hazard
npon the road was likewise contributory negligence and
that there was no roo1n for the application of the last
clear chance doctrine.
In Jones v. Armstrong, (Mich.) 204 N.W. 702, the
court refused to apply the last clear chance doctrine to a
pedestrian case where the plaintiff testified that he did
not look after he started to cross the street but traveled
40 feet or 1nore without ever looking again. The defendant in that case did not even testify, but the court said
that he would have had the right to suppose that the
plaintiff would not have been completely oblivious to the
approach of the approaching automobile and would have
taken smne precautions for her own safety. The same
situation is true in the present case. Even had the defendant observed the plaintiff when she first started to
cross the street, he would have no reason to anticipate
that she would continue to run in front of his car and
fail to yield the right of way to it.
The plaintiff in this case seeks to charge the defendant with observing the plaintiff's presence when she
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left the curb, notwithstanding that his view to the right
was obstructed by the glare of the sun, and then to a~
sume that the plaintiff would continue to run into tlw
path of the defendant's car. We submit that the la~t
clear chance doctrine cannot apply in any case where the
defendant's view is obstructed by darkness, glare or other
condition \Yhich prevents him from seeing the plaintiff
until she enters the path of his automobile. The defendant in this case was driving in a lawful n1anner within
the speed limit and had no reason to anticipate the
presence of any person until the plaintiff was in front
of his vehicle, and it was then too late for him to avoid
the accident.
See 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile La\Y &
Practice, Part 2, Section 2803, page 393 and 394, wherein it is said:

"* * * \Vhile a pedestrian nmy be in a zone of
danger as soon as he steps fr01n the sidewalk to
the street where vehicles are passing, he is not
then necessarily in danger fr01n any particular
automobile. Until he reaches a point where he i~
in a position of peril fr01n the aut01nobile of tlw
defendant and further progresses on his part or
other negligent conduct will not increase his danger, his negligence in proceeding forward can only
be regarded as a contributing proxilnate cause of
the injury."
See also 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Aut01nobile Law
& PraetirP, Part 2, Section 2804 at page 395:
.. For exa1nple, a motorist cannot be held liabl£>
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obstructed so that he could not see plaintiff
until it was too late to avoid injuring hin1."

wa8

..1(,

St•e also 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
Praetice, Part ~' Section 2806 at page -±02:
"However, it is pennissible to assun1e that
another will obey the law, and hence recovery under the doctrine rnay not be based on a failure
to anticipate a breach of law, ***"

POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON
THE PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO YIELD TH~ RIGHT OF WAY.

The plaintiff cmnplains of instruction 13 ( ~), (R.
180, 167), which reads as follows:
'' (2) A pedestrian who crosses a street at a
point other than within a rnarked crosswalk, or
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection
shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon
the roadway."
Reference is n1ade to Section 41-G-79 (a) F.C.A. 1953,
which is substantially the smne as the portion of the instruction to which the objection is rnade. Section 41-6-80
(a) U.C.A. 1953 then provides that even though a pedestrian rnay be required to yield the right of way, that a
driver shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any
pedestrian upon any roadway. Plaintiff further argues
that the portion of the instruction as given is inconsistent
with certain other instructions.
In instructions No. 6 and 7 the jury was told in substance that pedestrians and motorists each had the same
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rights to the use of public streets. Ho-wever, even though
a pedestrian and a motorist have an equal right to the
use of streets, one may nonetheless have the right of way
over the other. A pedestrian in a crosswalk has the right
of way over a motorist, even though a motorist has the
right to use the street. By the same token, a 1notorist
has the right of way over a pedestrian who chooses to
cross a street where there is no crosswalk. Had thf'
court failed to give instructions No. 6 and 7, the plaintiff
would then have argued that the court led the jury to
believe that the plaintiff could not cross a street outside
a crosswalk. The plaintiff did have a right to use the
street and did have a right to cross a street outside of a
crosswalk, but, nonetheless, when she attempted to do
so, she was under the necessity of yielding the right of
way to vehicles, and it was, therefore, proper for the
court to instruct the jury as it did in instruction No. 13
(2).

The appellant clai1ns that the expression: "failed
to yield the right of way" without 1nore is an erroneous
statement of the law. \Vith this we cannot agree. In the
first place, it is the language used in the statute, and in
the second place, that instruction in abnost identical
language has heretofore been approved by this court in

Rose, 5 Utah 2d 39, 296 Pac. (~d)
~Si. In that case a jury returned a verdiet of no cause
of action in a suit in which a pedestrian had been killed.
The instruction on contributory negligence to which the
appellant objected in that ea~e read as follow8:
the case of Okud,a

'Z:.
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.. You are instructed that the deceased in the
exercise of ordinary care, and in order not to be
guilty herself of contributory negligence, was
governed by the following rules of law at the time
and place in question.

*

*

*

"3. You are instructed that a pedestrian
erossing a roadway at any point other than within
a 1narked crosswalk or within an un1narked crosswalk at an intersection should yield the right of
way to all vehicles lawfully upon the highway.
Therefore, it was the duty of said deceased to
yield the right of way to vehicles upon the street
if you find that she was crossing or commencing
to cross the street under the above circumstances."
In the present case the physical facts definitely prove
that the defendant's vehicle was so close as to constitute
a har.ard and that the plaintiff should have yielded to it.
There is no evidence in this case to indicate that the defendant was traveling along the street at a speed greater
than 25-30 1niles per hour. Considering that from the
tilne the plaintiff left the ditch on the south side of 5th
Routh Street and either rapidly walked or ran in a northerly direction and that her path and that of the vehicle
met in the inside lane for eastbound traffic, it goes without saying that the plaintiff should have yielded the right
of way to the vehicle. She had to rapidly walk or run to
get into the path of the vehicle which was lawfully traveling on the road and at a proper rate of speed. If a pedestrian has to rapidly walk or run into the path of a vehicle
which is lawfully proceeding upon the road in order to
get into its path, it goes without saying that she failed
to yield the right of way to that vehicle.
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Cmnplaint is Inade that the court Ly its instruction:-:
failed to take into consideration the qualifying provision
of Section 41-6-80 (a) U.C.A. 1953. This is not so becausp
the court in instruction No. 7 went on to instruct the jury
that the driver's duty required him to be vigilant at all
times, to keep a lookout for traffic and other condition:'
reasonably to be anticipated, to keep his vehicle under
such control that he could stop quickly and avoid an aceident, and then stated that this duty continued even
though the defendant had the right of way. This fully
eovered the situation as presented in Section ±1-G-79 (a)
1 ~.C.A. 1953 and Section 41-6-80 (a) r.C.A. 1953.
Reference is Inade to the case of Coombs v. Perry.
2 Ctah 2d 381, 275 Pac. (2d) 680. That case is not in point
because it involved a situation where the plaintiff pedestrian was in a regular n1arked crosswalk in the Iniddle
of an intersection. She was proceeding in the crosswalk
in a ·westerly direction across Washington Boulevard and
on reaching the middle of the street, stopped and looked
to the north, but saw no southbound vehicles approaching
and took a fe·w steps westward when she suddenly became
aware of the approach of the defendant's car. In that
case a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and the defendant appealed, clai1ning that the plaintiff
had failed to prove negligence on the part of the defendant, and that as a matter of law the plaintiff was guilty
of contributon· negligenee. In considering the cases cited
by

defen~C'

between

rounsel, the court recognized the distinction

ra~es

in \Yhich the pedestrian "·as in a rrosswalk
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and where the pedestrian wa~ crossing where there was
no crosswalk, and said:
.. * * * But cases, cited h~- defendant ·which
involve accidents occurring outside of lawfully
designated crosswalks are for that reason distinguishable frmn the instant one; ***"

Ureat e1nphasis was laid upon the fact that the pedestrian was in a Inarked crosswalk and "hacl the right of
way." The court further stated that right of way simply
meant:
··that if hYo persons are so proceeding that if they
continued their course there would be danger of
collision, the disfavored one *** Inust give way,
and the favored one *** Inay proceed; and the
favored one *** may assume that this will be
done."
ln the instant case the plaintiff was not in a cross\valk, and the defendant was the favored person. Applying the concept of right of way as defined by the Supreme
Court, the facts proved that the plaintiff and the pedestrian continuing in their course not only constituted the
danger of a collision but actually precipitated one. The
defendant, therefore, had the right of way over the plaintiff. In its opinion in that case the court states that the
plaintiff, since she was in a crosswalk and had the right
of way, even had she seen the car, would have been entitled to assume that the car would yield the right of
way to her. The same situation 1nust apply to the defendant in the instant case-that even had he seen the plaintiff, he could make the same assumption that she would
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stop and yield the right of way to him. "\Vhen she rapidly
walked or ran into his path, it was then too late for him
to avoid the accident.
This is also the decision of the Utah Suprerne Court
in the case of Hess 1-'. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 Pae.
(2d) 510, which is cited with approval in the Coomb~
case, and wherein it was held that even though the plaintiff driving southward toward an intersection was negligent in not seeing an an1bulance come into the intersection frorn the west, that he was entitled to assume that
the mnbulance would stop for a stop sign and that he wa~
entitled to proceed until it becmne apparent to him that
the ambulance was not going to do so.
In commenting upon the case of Coombs 1/. Perry. tlw
appellant quotes an excerpt to the effect that the plaintiff under the facts as indicated in that case was not
obliged to focus her full and undivided attention on any
particular car. However, in that case she was in a crosswalk and the court indicates she might have to watch
for other pedestrians in the crosswalk and rernain awarl:'
of the possibility of other traffic. That is not the situation at all as presented in the instant case. The facts
in our case are strikingly silnilar to those in the case of
Sant 'l'. llliller, 115 rtah 559, 206 Pac. (2d) 719. In that
case the plaintiff was crossing a street outside of a
crosswalk and wa::-; walking in a diagonal southwesterly
direction arross the street. On rearhing a point 8 feet
we~t of the center line, the plaintiff wa~ struck by tlw
defendant'~ car. The trial eourt directed a verdirt in
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favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a nratter of law.
'rhis verdict was upheld by the Suprerne Court. Furthermore in that case the Suprerne Court held that the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply. The court placed
Pmphasis upon the fact that a rnotorist was not apt to
expect pedestrians to be crossing a street at this point,
and that in "a rnoving situation, *** he rnight reasonably
anticipate a person would stop before n1oving into the
path'' of his vehicle. The court also indicated that the
plaintiff knew he 'vas leaving a place of safety to travel
a hazardous course across the road and \Yas cutting
diagonally across the street; that after he crossed the
eenter line, he was not concerned with traffic coming from
any direction except the north. The court then said:

·•Appellant teas aware of the fact that he was
taking a chance in crossing the street a.t a place
contrary to law. He sho·uld also hrn:e known that
a driver of a vehcile would not ordinarily anticipate the presence of pedestrians on the street at
the time and place of the accident. l{nowing that
his presence might not be anticipated and knowing
that traffic on the west side of the road was approaching from the north and with nothing of importance to distract his attention, it was appellant's duty to watch the traffic he knew was approaching his location. *** Having omitted to
continue to watch, he failed to exercise the degree
of care requ~red of a pedestrian who leaves a place
of safety and places himself ~n a position of peril.
A greater degree of care ~s necessary upon the
part of a pedestrian who undertakes to cross a
city street at a prohibited place than is placed
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on one who uses a marked crosswalk. And especially is this true, 1vhen because of darkness and
climatic conditions, the opportunity for drivers
to clearly discern the presence of individuals on
the roadway is greatly restricted. It is ·not due
care for a person to fail to observe ·what Inight btapproaching danger when there is no necessity
to look elsewhere. Appellant was not confronted
with a situation 1vhich distracted his attention or
which precluded him from continuously ohserYir~g
the on-coming traffic and his curiosity to ''yatch
the movement of his friends is not sufficient to
excuse him for his delict. Reasonable care dietates that while appellant ''yas crossing the west
portion of the street, he should have been observant of the movement of this traffic south on tht'
street. He apparently disregarded potential danger for unin1portant reasons." (En1phasis added.)
In the instant case the plaintiff knew that 5th South
Street, particularly at that time of the n1orning, was a
heavily traveled street. She had encountered difficulty
in getting across the street on other occasions because
of traffic. In fact, it had been discussed between her
and the driver of the car that he would cmne around and
pick her up on her side of the street so as to obviate the
necessity of her crossing the street at that point, but she
replied it was not necessary. Because of the island in
the center of the street, the only direction frmn 1vhich
traffic could be anticipated was that traveling east. The
plaintiff "'as aware of the approach of an eastbound car,
but, nonetheless, rapidly walked or ran in a diagonal
direction across the street without paying any further
heed thereto. She was adu1ittedly not crossing the street
\
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m a <·ro~~walk and n1ight therefore anticipate that a
motorist would not be likely to be expecting her upon the
street at that point. She should have known that the
::~un n1ight be in the eye8 of eastbound 1notorists, but there
\\·as no sun in her eyes and nothing to prevent her frmn
looking to the west or in the only direction frmn which
traffic could be anticipated. She was not in a crosswalk
and therefore was not concerned with the presence of
other pedestrians that might be in the area. She had
erossed that street every day five tilnes a week for several
uwnths prior to the accident and therefore was fully
familiar with the type of the surface and did not have
to look for any obstructions or defects therein. Her sole
attention, as indicated in the Sant case, should have been
directed to the west until she reached the center island
and had she done this, it would have become readily apparent to her that she could not safely cross the street,
and she could easily have stopped and yielded the right
of way to the vehicle as required by law. See also Covington, v. Carpenter, supra.
Appellant also complains of that portion of instruCtion No. 13 (3) which states that a pedestrian who crosses
a street outside of a marked cross walk or within a
marked crosswalk at an intersection is required to exercise 1nore care and caution than in crossing in a pedestrian lane. This is a proper statement of the law, and in
the case of Sant v. Miller supra, the court, as indicated in
a part of the quotation previously cited, specifically
stated that a greater degree of care was placed upon a
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pedestrian who attempts to cross a street at a point outside a crosswalk.
The n1eaning which the appellant attempts to give to
the court's instructions is not only strained but far
fetched. The court's instructions clearly indicated that
the plaintiff had a right to cross the street, even outside
a crosswalk, but further informed the jury that if tlw
plaintiff crossed a street outside a crosswalk, she had to
yield the right of way and had to exercise more diligence
than if she was crossing in a pedestrian lane. The court
specifically instructed the jury on the defendant's duty
to keep a proper lookout and travel at a proper speed,
and specifically stated that such duty continued even
though the defendant had the right of way over the plaintiff. Under these instructions even though the plaintiff
failed to yield the right of way to the defendant, it was up
to the jury to determine whether such negligence on her
part was a proxilnate cause of the accident, or whether
the negligence, if any, on the part of the defendant was
the proxirnate cause of the accident. \Ye do not see how
these issues could have been Inore clearl~T presented to the
jury than they were done in the instant case.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT BY IMPLICATION OR OTHERWISE ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCT THE JURY TO THE
PLAINTIFF'S PREJUDICE THAT ALL PLAINTIFF DID
WAS TO MERELY GLANCE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE
APPROACHING TRAFFIC.

On this point the appellant refers to the court's instruetion No. 13 (1 ), (R. 180), which wa~ ·:with referenef'
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to the plaintiff's duty to look and observe whether there
were an~- antmnobiles in such close proxi1nity as to affect
her safety and to eontinue to keep such a reasonable and
prudent lookout as was reasonably necessary for her prote<'tion. The instruction then stated that "a 1nere glance
in the direction of the approaching autmnobile is not
:-;uffieient.'' The appellant claims that by this portion of
the instruction the trial judge indicated to the jury that
all the plaintiff did was 1nerely glance in the direction
of the approaching autmnobile. The instruction is not
:-;usceptible to any such interpretation, but even if it were,
the matter was cured by the court's instruction ~ o. 1,
(R. 168), in which the court said:
"1~he court has no opinion, and does not seel\:
to express any in these instructions with respect
to what the facts are. It is your sole prerogative
to determine the facts frmn the evidence."

\Ve subnrit that the instruction contains a correct
state1nent of the law and that certainly a mere glanc~
in the direction of the approaching automobile is not
sufficient. The court did not state that the plaintiff
made a 1nere glance, but outlined what type of a lookout
the plaintiff had to keep, and, as indicated by this court
in the case of Mingus v. Olsson, 114: Utah 505, 201 Pac.
(2d) 495, a 1nere glance in the direction of an approaching
automobile is not sufficient.
Under the facts in this case the jury could well have
found that all the plaintiff did was to take a mere glance.
It is doubtful whether she ever saw the defendant's autoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
nwbile because the vehicle which she saw had not yet
reached the curve, and she could not state whether it
was going south on 5th South Street or coming around
the curve. This obviously could not have been the defendant's vehicle. Furthermore, she did not see the vehicle
long enough to 1nake any estimate as to its speed. Certainly, her estin1ate as to its distance was erroneou:-:.
There was no evidence to indicate that the vehicle \\'a~
traveling 1nore than 25-30 miles per hour, and it is undisputed that while the plaintiff rapidly walked or ran
20 feet frmn the curb, she and the vehicle crossed paths.
At the trial we felt and still feel that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law by
failing to look again to the west for approaching eastbound traffic after leaving the south curb line and in
failing to yield the right of way to the vehicle. The type
of lookout which she maintained was a n1atter for the jury
to decide under the court's instructions. This was fully
covered in the court's instruction, and it was properly
indicated that a mere glance would not be sufficient.
There was evidence upon which the jury could find that
all the plaintiff did was take a quick glance and failed
to properly evaluate the situation. This is perfectly evident frmu the 1nanner in which the accident occurred. Th~
court did not b:· any stretch of the i1nagination instruct
the jnr.'· that all the plaintiff did was take a 1nere glance,
but informed thein that if that \nl~ all she did do, she
failed to keep a proper lookout. The factual question wati
left to the ;jnr:· for decision. There could have been no
prejudiee in an:· event in view of plaintiff's admission
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that she failed to look again as she crossed the street.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

l ~ nder this heading and aside frmn the error theretofore clai1ned by the appellant in other portions of the
brief, the only contention Inade is that the negligence of
the defendant ·was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Appellant again refers to the defendant's testimony
and indicates that the defendant traveled in the south
lane for some distance before turning into the north lane.
This confusion on the appellant's part is again due to the
markings, C-1 and C-2 as placed upon the diagra1n. They
were placed by the witness, Myers. C-2 indicated the position of the defendant's car according to the witness,
.Myers, when an unidentified eastbound vehicle was at
the point indicated by C-1 on the diagrmn. No one testified that the defendant's car was ever in the position C-1
as shown on the diagram. The only testimony in the case
as bearing on this point is the defendant's testimony that
as he 1nade the turn from lOth East onto 5th South Street
he proceeded directly into the inside lane and continued
in that lane up to the moment of the impact. The glare
of the sun to the right of his car interfered with his vision
to the right but not with his vision straight ahead, and he
saw the plaintiff as soon as she rapidly ran into the path
of his car and when she was 10 feet away and on a line
with the right front fender. At that time he applied
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his brakes and swerved to the right, and had probably
traveled 2 feet to the right at the tirne of the ilnpact.
There was also evidence fron1 the witness, Larson, that
the irnpact occurred s01newhere between the hood emblem
in the center of the car and the left front fender. Beariw~·
all of these points in rnind, the plaintiff fr01n the tirue slw
entered the path of the defendant's vehicle could not haYP
traveled more than 3-4 feet at rnost before she 'Yas struck
by the car. The vddth of the car ,,-ould not be rnore than
6 feet, and the car itself had turned 2 feet to the right
at the tin1e that the irnpact occurred. The defendant under such circurncstanes when the peril first became apparent to hirn had no opportunity w"lmh;oever to ayoid
the accident.
Counsel again rnakes reference to the case of Comnbs
1:. Perry 7 supra, and attempts to in1ply that if the defendant had seen the plaintiff at the curb, he should havP
known that she ·would throv{ all caution to the wind and
run into the path of his car. This is not the law and i~
not the stateruent contained in Coombs r. Perry. That
case, as we have heretofore noted, involved a pedestrian
who was in a crosswalk and for that reason is not in
point. Furtherrnore, the court did not atternpt to chargP
the defendant with any knowledge of danger until the
plaintiff had crossed the center line of "\Yashington Boulevard. As we have heretofore seen in this case, the defendant, even had he seen the plaintiff. would not have
anticipated any peril or known that tlw plaintiff would
foolhardily run into the path of his car.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43

Counsel quotes from Coornhs u. Perry to show that if
the plaintiff had seen the defendant's car approaching,
~he would have the right to asstune that the defendant
would yield the right of way to her. This is wholly untrue
under the facts of this case. In the Comnbs rase the
plaintiff \Yas in a crosswalk, and if she had seen the defendant'~ car approaching, had the right to assume that
the defendant would yield the right of way to her. Howt>Yer, in the present case the plaintiff was not in a crosswalk and would have no right to nmke an~· such assumption, hut was under the obligation of continuing to keep
a lookout in the only direction frmn whieh rars were proc•eeding, to-wit: frmn the west traveling east. It was then
her duty to yield the right of way and not the duty of
the defendant to yield the right of way to her. In fact,
the language quoted by appellant frmn the Comnbs case
would apply to the defendant under the eiretunstances
of this case. Since the defendant had the right of way,
even had he seen the plaintiff, he would have been entitled to assunte that the plaintiff would have yielded
the right of way to hiin. While the defendant's view to
the right and beyond the inunediate path of his car was
obstructed by the sun, the plaintiff's view was not ob~tructed at all as she would be looking away frmn the sun.
Had she looked as she continued to cross the street, she
would have realized the danger, stopped and yielded
the right of way to the defendant, and the accident would
never have occurred.
t'.

Counsel again makes reference to the case of W inn
Read, supra, but, as we have heretofore pointed out,
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that case is not in point. If the plaintiff in that case had
traveled 30 rods down the road in a direct line of vision
and in the same lane of traffic as the defendant before
the in1pact occurred, then, of course, the defendant should
have been aware of his presence in that lane during all
that period of time. Ho·wever, in the instant case the
plaintiff did not cross into the path of the defendant'::; car
until it was too late for the defendant to do anything to
avoid the accident. The questions of the

defendant'~

negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence and
whether either proxirnately caused the accident were submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions.
At the tirne of the trial we felt that the plaintiff

wa~

guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law and
made appropriate motions both at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case and of the entire case for a directed verdict.

If, as the plaintiff now claims, the defendant's

negligence as a n1atter of law ·was the sole proximate
cause of the accident, it is indeed strange that the plaintiff failed to nwve for a directed verdict. \Ye feel that
there is no rnerit whatsoever to this contention. Furtherrnore, if under the facts of this case the defendant's negligencp was the sole proxirnate cause of the accident, it
·would give license for a pedestrian to cross a dangerous
street in faee of heavy traffic. not in a cross\Yalk, throw
all caution to the winds, and then state that the defendant
had the sole responsibility for avoiding the aeeident.
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CONCLL"SIO~

rrhis Blatter was submitted to the jury by appropriate instructions. l' nder all of the facts and considering
the plaintiff's knowledge that it ·was hazardous to cross
the street at this particular ti1ne and place and outside
of any cross\valk, and considering further the admitted
fact that the plaintiff from the ti1ne she left the south
eurb line rapidly walked or ran diagonally across the
street in a northeasterly direction without making any
further observations to the west, or the only direction
from which traffic could be anticipated, it is difficult to
see how the jury could have returned any verdict other
than the one which it did.
\Ve respectfully submit that the plaintiff had a fair
trial and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RICH & STRONG
Attor-neys for Defendant and
Respondent.
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